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Abstract   
In this paper, we propose a simple short-run post-Keynesian model in which the key 
aspects of shadow banking, namely securitization and the production of structured 
finance instruments, are explicitly formalized. At the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first attempt to broaden purely real-side post-Keynesian models and their traditional 
focus on shareholder-value orientation, the financialization of non-financial firms, and 
the profit-led vs wage-led dichotomy. We rather put emphasis on the role of financial 
institutions and rentier-friendly environment in determining the predominance of 
specific growth and distribution regimes. First, we illustrate the macroeconomic 
rationale of shadow banking practices. We show how, before the 2007-8 crisis, 
securitization and shadow banking allowed for an increase in profitability for the whole 
financial sector, while apparently keeping leverage under control. Second, we define a 
variety of shadow-banking-led regimes in terms of economic activity, productive capital 
accumulation, and income distribution. We show that both an ‘exhilarationist’ and a 
‘stagnationist’ regime may prevail, nevertheless characterized by a probable increase in 
income inequality between rentiers and wage earners. 
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1. Introduction 
The outbreak of the sub-prime mortgage crisis has brought to the forefront the role of the 
so-called shadow banking system as major responsible for the 2007-2008 financial 
meltdown. Paul McCulley, former managing director at PIMCO investment fund, is 
generally considered as the father of the expression ‘shadow banks’. With this term, he 
referred to those financial intermediaries funding their banking activity with uninsured 
commercial papers and without the backstop of the FED (McCulley, 2007:2). However, 
such definition, together with its implicit distinction between traditional regulated banks 
on the one hand and new, unregulated (i.e. shadow) financial institutions on the other, is 
controversial. Caverzasi et al. (2018) illustrate how this parallelism may be misleading, 
as the two kinds of institution should not be conceived as substitutes or competitors 
within the same business class, nor there exists a clear-cut distinction between those 
financial institutions that are involved in shadow banking, and those that are not (FSB, 
2017:43). Fein (2013) notes that shadow bank “exists as an integral part of the regulated 
banking system (Fein, 2013:2)”. Most of the practices usually considered as shadow 
banking (see more on this below) actually originate, are performed, or are at least 
indirectly related to traditional regulated financial operators. We believe that it is 
therefore better to refer to a system involving different financial institutions and 
financial activities (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Adrian and Ashcraft 2012; Gorton, 2010). A 
system with the securitizing process at its core (Noeth and Sengupta, 2011; and Gorton 
and Metric, 2012), which is therefore the cornerstone of our model.  
An intensive debate has sparked among economists as to the implications of the 
development of shadow banking for both banking theory and monetary economics. 
Following Adrian and Shin (2010), banking theorists have so far provided a prevalently 
microeconomic perspective on ‘the changing nature of financial intermediation’ as due to 
the development of shadow banking. They have described in details the functioning of 
shadow banking actors, their complex nest of relations, and the most relevant features of 
the corresponding financial instruments (Coval et al., 2009; Gorton and Metrick, 
2010,2012; Cetorelli et al., 2012). However, they pay relatively scarce attention to the 
consequences of the development of shadow banking on macroeconomic variables such 
as economic growth, income distribution, as well as on the overall macroeconomic 
stability and systemic resilience to financial shocks. Indeed, a few works in this strand of 
literature adopt a macroeconomic perspective (see Mian and Sufi (2015), for instance). 
Nonetheless, albeit presenting some thematic overlaps with our analysis, they mainly 
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focus on the investigation of the specific causes of the last financial crisis rather than on 
the more fundamental rationale for shadow banking development. Also, the theoretical 
framework is different. Whilst Mian and Sufi (2015) develop their analysis inside the 
conventional boundaries of mainstream economics, our work takes inspiration from the 
post-Keynesian approach.  
A second strand of literature – i.e. post-Keynesian monetary economics – takes 
numerous insights from the banking approach, but shows much more concern for the 
macroeconomic aspects. This is favoured by the existence of a macroeconomic 
theoretical framework for the study of financial crises - mainly developed around the 
work of Hyman P. Minsky - and a macro-modelling approach in which the financial and 
monetary sides of the economy are explicitly modelled. Several studies have gained 
momentum in the immediate aftermath of the 2007-8 financial crisis by interpreting 
shadow banking development, and the financial crisis itself, through the lens of the 
Minskyan financial instability hypothesis (Tymoigne, 2009; Nersisyan and Wray, 2010; 
Dymski, 2010). From a methodological point of view, several of these contributions rely 
upon argumentative analyses. They do not frame shadow banking in a formal model and 
do not try to assess analytically its economy-wide implications. At the best of our 
knowledge, only a few studies have tried to model the intrinsic fragility of contemporary 
financial systems (Eatwell et. al, 2008; Nikolaidi, 2015; Bhaduri et al., 2015). Nikolaidi 
(2015), for instance, models securitization in a stock-flow-consistent model in order to 
assess the heightened macroeconomic vulnerability that may arise out of financial sector-
induced increases in households’ leverage. Eatwell et al. (2008) focus on the pro-cyclical 
and destabilizing dynamics of investment banks’ leverage emerging out of securitization 
practices. Finally, Bhaduri et al. (2015) describe systemic fragility as due to 
securitization-fuelled boom-and-boost cycles in financial assets’ prices. Most of these 
studies still focus on a single specific aspect of the shadow banking system only. 
Nikolaidi (2015) and Bhaduri et al. (2015), for instance, do not bring into the picture the 
leading role of repos in fuelling the expansion of shadow banking practices. Eatwell et al. 
(2008) offer an oversimplified representation of repos, restrictively identified as a 
monetary policy tool. They neglect an explicit treatment of repos as financial relations 
connecting the different actors involved in the process of securitization and in the 
creation of structured finance products. More in general, all these contributions try to 
show how some aspects of shadow banking can be sources of heightened financial and 
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economic instability. However, they do not match their macroeconomic analysis with a 
clear investigation of the rationale and the purposes of shadow banking itself. 
The abovementioned post-Keynesian contributions on financial instability in 
financialized economies are part of the wider post-Keynesian literature on finance-
dominated capitalism. This literature mainly consists of new-Kaleckian or Harrodian 
models aiming to study the real-side effects of the financialization of non-financial firms 
(henceforth NFF). Accordingly, it identifies and perhaps reduces financialization to the 
so-called shareholder value orientation, i.e. the increased concern by NFF management 
for shareholders’ interests as opposed to stakeholders’ interests (Stockhammer, 2004; 
Skott and Ryoo, 2008; Hein, 2010; Onaran et al., 2011). On the one hand, this change in 
NFF corporate governance is portrayed as the responsible (among other factors) for the 
reduction in workers’ bargaining power and in the corresponding wage share on national 
income. On the other hand, NFF financialization has also induced NFF to more 
extensively deploy retained earnings to distribute dividends to shareholders and to 
finance financial investments, rather than productive investments and innovation efforts 
(Mazzucato, 2013; Botta, 2016). Both phenomena are considered as conducive to 
economic stagnation and rising income inequality, in particular in the context of wage-
led economies (see Onaran and Obst, 2016). Although extremely relevant, the post-
Keynesian literature on finance-dominated capitalism does not take into account a 
salient aspect of financialization itself, i.e. the development of shadow banking. Indeed, 
by relying on pure ‘real-side’ models that by definition neglect any ‘active’ financial 
sector, they cannot capture the intrinsic evolution of the financial sector as such, as well 
as the ensuing effects on the real side of the economy. With the present paper, we try to 
fill this gap. 
The goal of this paper is twofold. First, we take inspiration from the ‘banking 
approach’ by describing and connecting each other the crucial aspects of shadow 
banking, i.e. the securitization of existing assets, the production and issuance of complex 
structured financial products (CDOs) using securitized assets as ‘raw materials’, the 
deployment of repos as source of funds for the systemic purchase of securitised assets. 
However, differently from the ‘banking approach’, we abandon its micro focus in order to 
adopt a macro perspective. Indeed, we frame shadow bank institutions and practices in a 
wider macro model. We focus on the behaviour of entire financial compartments, and 
eventually on the financial system as a whole, rather than on single operators. We do this 
in order to formally investigate the intrinsic rationale of shadow banking. In particular, 
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we show how shadow banking activities have been designed and implemented in order to 
increase the profitability of financial institutions – commercial banks and investment 
banks alike - and, at the same time, apparently and artificially maintain their leverage 
under control through the exploitation of regulatory arbitrage practices. In this regard, 
our work complements the previous contributions by Eatwell et al. (2008), Nikolaidi 
(2015) and Bhaduri et al. (2015), We put the several pieces of shadow banking 
(securitization, CDOs and repos) together in order to provide a comprehensive picture of 
shadow banking itself and to unveil its logic.  
Second, in the final part of this paper, we assess the impacts that shadow banking 
practices exert on the whole economy. Our purpose is to move the post-Keynesian 
literature on finance-dominated capitalism away from its (almost exclusive) focus on the 
financialization of NFFs. In a way, we extend the macroeconomic analysis recently 
provided by Bhaduri et al. (2015), and we show how shadow banking ballooning may 
affect a variety of macroeconomic variables such as economic activity, real sector 
investments, and income distribution. An interesting finding, and perhaps a novelty of 
our work, is the description of shadow banking as functional to the creation of a rentier-
friendly economy. In fact, we show that rising income inequality in financialized 
economies may be due to the increasing imbalance between income (wages) generated in 
the real sector and income (rents) emerging from financial assets originated by active 
shadow banking financial engineering, rather than from the traditional distributional 
conflict between workers and capitalists. We want to stress that, our analysis focuses on 
short-run dynamics only, whilst the long-run sustainability of shadow bank-related 
economic changes are out of the scope of the present work. 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we describe how our economy works, 
and how the financial and the real sectors are intertwined according to the national 
accounting stock-flow-consistent approach (Godley and Lavoie, 2007; Caverzasi and 
Godin, 2014; Bezemer, 2016). Section 3 deals with the effects that securitization and the 
production of structured financial products have on the profitability and leverage of both 
commercial banks (henceforth CBs) and financial firms (henceforth FFs). Section 4 
moves the attention to the real side of the economy. We present a simple short-run post-
Keynesian model to show the effects of shadow banking practices on economic activity, 
productive investments, and income distribution. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. A simple closed economy model with shadow banking 
There is no doubt that the remarkable expansion of the financial sector with respect to 
the real side of the economy represents a salient aspect of the more recent evolution of 
developed economies. This long-term process involved a deep change in the structure of 
the financial system, as well as in its relation with the real side of the economy (see Botta 
et al., 2015: 200-1). 
The core of the so-called shadow banking is the process of securitization: “securitized 
banking is the business of packaging and reselling loans, with repo agreements as the 
main source of funds” (Gorton and Metrick 2012:425). This financial activity involves 
different kinds of financial institutions. Various layers of intermediation and several 
financial assets’ transformations take place within the financial system (see Pozsar et al., 
2013). Through securitization, different types of credit (e.g. student loans, consumer 
loans, mortgages etc.) are transformed into a multitude of financial instruments. These 
types of credit are first sold to other financial institutions (e.g. issuers of asset-backed 
securities, investment banks, brokers and dealers) and then transformed into 
increasingly complex structured financial instruments (MBS, ABS, CDO, CDO2, etc.). The 
two key financial instruments in this process are structured finance - CDOs in our model 
- and repos. In the end, financial relationships are commodified (Lysandrou, 2005) and 
used to ‘produce’ complex financial instruments, which are sold to savers in different 
forms through the intermediation of diverse financial institutions (e.g. Money Market 
Mutual Funds, pension funds, insurance companies).  
Figure 1 below captures some of the preeminent aspects of shadow banking, and the 
main elements of the rise of securitization activities. It shows the values of: (i) securitised 
real estate loans, held as assets by the financial sector; (ii) mortgages issued by CBs; (iii) 
repos, displayed as an asset of CBs. MBS and repos exhibit a skyrocketing rise from mid-
1990s, and a sharp fall after the 2007-2008 crisis. The dynamic of mortgages appears 
relatively smoother. However, it is important to bear in mind that the nominal value of 
this type of stock is significantly higher than the other two. Two considerations are of 
particular interest. First, the steep rise of MBS anticipated and somehow drove the rise in 
repos and mortgages. MBS started growing in 1996, exactly when the Fed reinterpreted 
the Glass-Steagall Act “allowing bank holding companies to earn up to 25 percent of their 
revenues in investment banking (Sherman, 2009:2)”. Second, the fall in the stock of 
securitised mortgages started in the third quarter of 2006. Therefore, it not only 
anticipated the dynamics of the other two series, but it also started one year before what 
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is commonly acknowledged as the starting date of the crisis (August 2007). This last 
point is extremely relevant to understand how FFs’ financial solidity dramatically 
worsened in the run up to the crisis (see more on this below). 
  
[FIGURE 1] 
 
This section provides a formal representation of the abovementioned key aspects of 
shadow banking, and of their interconnections with the financial and the real sides of the 
economy. We take inspiration from the case of US economy since that it is commonly 
considered as the most developed financialized economy with shadow banking 
prominently at the centre of the financial system.  Nonetheless, our formal analysis can 
also be applied to other economies, some European countries at the very least. Two 
points is worth stressing in this regard. First, in the case of Europe, the distinction 
between non-shadow banking institutions and shadow banks is somehow harder to 
capture than in the USA given the “universal banking” model characterizing most 
European economies (see Jeffers and Plihon, 2016). This is even the more so after the 
extensive financial deregulation taking place since the beginning of the 1980s in several 
European countries, and allowing European commercial banks to become financial 
conglomerates performing most of the activities usually carried out by investment banks 
and brokers and dealers. On top of this, securitization has reached considerably lower 
levels in the euro area than in the USA, eurozone securitization amounting to roughly 
two-fifth of the USA one (see Bakk-Simon et al., 2012). Despite these differences, Bakk-
Simon et al. (2012) notes that “securitisation picked up significantly in Europe and in the 
euro area over recent years spurred by positive developments in house prices and 
mortgage activity in several euro area countries (Bakk-Simon et al., 2012, p.12)”. Like in 
the USA, “the bulk of [European] securitised loans were (are) home mortgages, [which] 
supported credit growth, especially for mortgage loans (Bakk-Simon et al., 2012, p.13)”. 
On the one hand, these processes contributed to feed the build-up of housing bubbles in 
countries such as Ireland, Spain, the Netherlands and the UK. On the other hand, a 
relatively high “derecognition rate” (i.e. the legal procedure through which originating 
banks can effectively put securitized assets out of their own balance sheets) allowed loans 
originators to reduce capital requirements vis-à-vis the booming creation of those very 
same assets. Second, despite of a certain degree of heterogeneity among European 
countries, an increasing body of literature stresses the importance of rising house prices 
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and of wealth effects as relevant forces behind increasing consumption expenditures in 
some European countries (Slacalek, 2009; Stockhammer and Wildauer, 2016). This is 
the case of Anglo-Saxon economies such as Ireland and the UK, “financially-developed” 
small economies such as Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands, as well as of other euro 
countries such as Finland and Spain. As it will become clearer later on, all these aspects 
constitute central pieces of our narrative about the rationale and the macro consequences 
of shadow banking. Accordingly, we can consider our analysis as rather “transversal” 
from a geographical point of view, certainly based and inspired by the US experience, yet 
applicable to other developed countries.        
We describe shadow banking as based on three main processes connecting two main 
institutions (CBs and FFs): (1) the securitization of mortgages by CBs, which, through 
this practice, put some of their assets off their own balance sheet and onto the balance 
sheet of FFs (read investment banks); (2) the production and issuance by FFs of 
structured financial products (CDOs) ultimately sold to NFFs and rentiers; (3) the 
provision by CBs of credit to FFs through the repo market in order to allow the latter to 
purchase securitised assets from the former. It goes without saying that, in reality, 
shadow banking is much more complicated than this.1 It certainly involves many more 
actors than just CBs and FFs. For instance, Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) may act as 
intermediaries in the perhaps arm-length relation between CBs and FFs. Even further, 
the purchases of CDOs by rentiers may be effectively intermediated by hedge funds or 
MMMFs. Nonetheless, according to the schematization of shadow banking proposed by 
Gorton and Metrick (2010) and Adrian and Shin (2010), these additional aspects appear 
as rather superfluous to our attempt to capture the deepest logic of shadow banking 
itself. Our simplified, although relatively comprehensive, representation of shadow 
banking suffices to analyse its essential rationale (section 3), as well as its short-run 
macroeconomic implications on the real economy (section 4). 
Table 1 shows the Balance Sheet of the economy. We assume a closed private 
economy. It comprises six sectors, namely workers, rentiers, NFFs, CBs, and FFs (i.e. 
investment banks, broker and dealers, and hedge funds), and the Central Bank. We take 
in to account nine different assets. CBs hold two sets of assets. On the one hand, (JCB) 
denotes sector’s own funds as initially provided by CBs’ shareholders when subscribing 
                                                        
1 FSB (2017:43), in its `narrow definition’, identifies five (broad) economic functions of Shadow Banking, 
our representation of shadow banking does not capture only one of them (lending dependent on short term 
financing) while the other four, perhaps in a highly stylized manner, are included. 
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equities. We assume CBs to hold their own funds (or Tier 1 capital) as reserves in form of 
cash. On the other hand, there are assets used by the traditional banking system to 
provide different forms of credit to the other sectors of the economy: loans (L) to NFF, 
repos (RP) to FF, and mortgages (M) to working households. CBs move out a portion (z) 
of mortgages from their balance sheet, selling this fraction to FF. This operation is 
usually implemented through Special Purpose Vehicles, which, for sake of clarity, we 
decided not to include in our model. As mentioned above the rise of international 
financial holdings is a crucial element in the transformation of the US financial system, 
due to their capacity to implement all the steps of the securitization process described in 
this paper. We nonetheless decided to distinguish between CBs and other FFs, in order to 
underline the specificities of the traditional banks, may these be part of holdings or not. 
We leave the analysis on financial holdings to future investigations. 
 
[TABLE 1] 
CBs have two kinds of liabilities: workers’ deposits (D) and equities (ECB). The former 
is held by working households and does not pay interests, while rentiers hold the latter. 
Equities can here be conceived as the counterpart of CBs’ own funds. For the sake of 
simplicity, they are assumed to remain constant. This also applies to FF, whose equities 
(EFF) are again held by the rentiers. FFs rely on two sources of funds: they issue 
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) which are sold to rentiers (CDOR) and to NFF 
(CDONFF), and they use repos (RP) to collect funds from CBs.2. Next to cash (JFF), FFs 
hold the fraction of mortgages (zM) purchased from CBs and transformed into CDOs.  
Reverting to the real side of the economy, we consider two classes of households. 
Workers hold their wealth in form of deposits (D) and houses (pHH). Their stock of debt 
is represented by mortgages (M). Rentiers do not accumulate debt and hold their wealth 
in form of financial assets: Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOR) and Equities (E). NFF 
are indebted toward CBs (L) and own both real and financial assets, respectively K (the 
nominal value of real capital) and collateralized debt obligations (CDONFF). 
 
[TABLE 2]  
                                                        
2 Repo financing partially take place between brokers and dealers themselves. This fact cannot be captured 
by the simplified aggregate perspective put forward in this paper. Nevertheless, our model still succeeds in 
capturing the core of the financial architectures characterizing shadow banking, and the fact that the 
traditional banking sector plays a key role as a net source of financing for the financial firms such as 
brokers and dealers. This fact has emerged as clear in the run up to the crisis. Indeed, according to 
Copeland et al. (2012), “clearing banks are not only agents, but also the largest creditors in the tri-party 
repo market on each business day (Copeland et al., 2012 p.6)” 
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Table 2 shows the so-called full integration matrix, thus including net financial flows 
among the different sectors (transaction flow matrix above the first dotted line) and the 
update of the stock (revaluation matrix between the second and third dotted line).  
Workers receive income in the form of wages (W) by NFF and have two outflows: they 
buy consumption goods from NFF and pay interests on their outstanding stock of 
mortgages (iM*M). The flow associated with interest payments on mortgages will split 
between CBs and FFs according to the share (z) of mortgages owned by the latter. 
Rentiers will receive dividends (DIV) from CBs (DIVCB) and FFs (DIVFF), as well as 
interest on CDOs (i.e. r*CDOR), on which they also pay a fee (CDOR).3 More in detail, the 
interest rate (r) stands for the fixed coupon interest rate originally defined in CDO 
contracts, rather than the effective interest rate that eventually emerges from market 
transactions, and connected (in a negative way) to CDOs prices.4 NFF pay wages (W) and 
sell consumption goods (C), and investment goods (I). Their financial earnings are the 
interests received on the share of CDO they hold (r*CDONFF), while their financial 
outflow is made by the fee they pay to FFs (f*CDONFF) and the interest on loans paid to 
CBs (iL*L).  
We assume CBs to distribute to rentiers, in the form of dividends (DIVCB), all the 
earnings they make out of the interest received on their assets. This applies also to FFs, 
whose inflows are the interests received on the share of mortgages owned (zM), and the 
fees on the CDO issued (f*CDO).  
We assume NFF not to distribute dividends. Rather than being a limitation of our 
work, we excluded this mechanism for two reasons. First, the inclusion of this additional 
distributive channel would have made the understanding of the consequences of shadow 
banking on income distribution harder to catch. Second, and more importantly, our 
modelling choice allows us to emphasize the novelty of our contribution with respect to 
the existing post-Keynesian literature on this topic. Indeed, this literature has mainly 
focused on the financialization of NFFs (Davis, 2017), specifically highlighting the 
                                                        
3 The decision of including two specular flows (f*CDO and r*CDO) originating from the same asset is 
motivated by the attempt of making explicit the considerable amount of profits FFs can make out of fees 
charged on the financial assets they sell to the savers.  
4  Indeed, financial corporations originally engineered CDO contracts as apparently riskless financial 
products, guarantying stable prices and relatively high (coupon) interest rates to final investors. This is 
why, before the crisis, most of them got ‘triple A’ evaluations from rating agencies, and they were vastly 
used as collaterals in repo agreements. Accordingly, investments on CDOs were not primarily driven by 
speculations on possible capital gains and changes in their prices. We think the evolution of their prices 
(prior to their collapse when the crisis erupted, of course), and of the corresponding effective interest rate, 
to be minor elements driving final savers’ investments on CDOs. 
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mechanism of ‘shareholder value orientation’, and its impacts on functional income 
distribution between profits and wages (see Hein and van Treeck, 2008). In our analysis, 
we focus on a different channel through which the generated income is distributed, 
namely increasing interest payments on outstanding mortgages by working households 
eventually remunerated to rentiers through the mechanisms of shadow banking. In this 
respect, two more points are worth stressing. First, the distributive process we describe 
puts emphasis on the active role shadow banking plays as producer and issuer of 
structured financial products through which income is redistributed from working 
households to rentiers. Second, such mechanism is complementary to the more 
traditional distributional process between wages, NFFs’ profits and distributed dividends 
to rentiers. Indeed, the inclusion in our model of NFFs’ dividends to rentiers (see Hein, 
2010) would simply render the level of income inequality more pronounced (i.e. rentier 
would benefit of an additional source of income). Even further, it will not change at all 
the short-run distributional consequences of finance-led booms in the housing market 
(see section 4). Actually, what we would observe is an even stronger tendency towards 
the creation of a rentier-friendly economy, in which rentiers’ income share likely 
increases regardless of the expansionary/contractionary regime associated to the 
overgrowth of shadow banking (see more on this below).  
Despite the abovementioned departures with respect to previous post-Keynesian 
contributions, we still preserve the other relevant aspect of NFFs’ financialization, 
namely the fact that they can deploy retained earnings to accumulate financial assets 
(CDONFF) rather than investing in the real economy. In this paper, we take into account 
multiple financial assets, each of them associated to a specific interest rate. Given our 
aim, we do not discuss how each specific interest rate is determined (e.g. by applying a 
mark-up rate on the ‘cost of liquidity’ as influenced by central bank monetary policy). 
Rather, we are interested in the structure of the whole set of interest rates. In this 
context, suffice to say that the levels of the interest rates generally depends on the 
relative perceived risk of the underlying assets, which in turn depends upon their 
maturity, their level of collateralization, and their degree of ‘shiftability’ (see Mehrling, 
2011).5 Accordingly, we can safely assume the following interest rate structure to prevail, 
at least in ‘normal times’: 𝑖𝑀 ≥ 𝑖𝐿 > 𝑟 > 𝑖𝑅𝑃. 
                                                        
5 Following Mehrling (2011), government bonds are usually considered as risk-free assets because financial 
institutions can always move them on the balance sheet of the central bank in exchange for reserves in the 
context of refinancing operations. By the same token, the degree of safety of any financial asset is more 
generally assessed according to the degree by which it can be shifted at par on the balance sheet of other 
operators in exchange for liquidity.  
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The revaluation matrix is straightforward, as it shows the change in the level of the 
same stocks described within the explanation of the aggregate balance sheet. 
Nonetheless, some elements are worth noting. First, following Adrian and Shin (2010), 
FFs finance their holding of new mortgages either through repo from CB or by selling 
new CDO contracts to rentiers and to NFF.6 They rely on these two different types of 
borrowings for two reasons. On the one hand, the issuance of apparently riskless long-
term obligations (i.e. CDOs) requires overcollateralization (the value of purchased 
underlying securitised assets must be higher than the value of issued collateralized 
obligations). Accordingly, FFs can only partially finance assets purchases through CDOs 
issuances, the remaining part being financed by recollecting funds on the repo market. 
On the other hand, repo markets stretch short-term cheap funds, however prone to dry 
up quickly. Accordingly, FFs will try to largely rely upon long-term CDOs-linked 
borrowing. Even though relatively more expensive than repos, CDOs-linked borrowing 
represents a more stable source of finance than the latter. Second, NFF can use their 
profits, as well as the new inflow of loans, to finance the purchase of real or financial 
capital. Finally, we assume house purchases to give rise to purely intra-sectorial 
exchanges among households. For the sake of simplicity, we do not consider the 
construction of new houses (more on this below). Accordingly, the price of existing 
dwellings adjusts to balance the supply and demand for houses, the latter being fed by 
new mortgages. New mortgages conceded to workers’ households will eventually show 
up in price changes of the existing dwellings.  
In this paper, we focus on the ‘financialization-led’ short-run dynamics of the 
economy, rather than on its long-run macroeconomic stability. Our main interest is to 
analyse how shadow banking-related current flows, as emerging from accumulated 
financial positions and past financialization processes, influence current economic 
activity and income distribution. In this regard, financialization has first allowed a wider 
range of households to benefit from an increasing amount of (then securitised) 
mortgages. This, in turn, has stimulated economic activity by feeding the construction of 
new dwellings. Without neglecting the importance of this channel, here we do not 
explicitly consider it. As far as the impacts on the GDP are concerned, we rather focus on 
the positive effect financialization may have induced on aggregate consumption and 
economic activity mainly by leading to higher prices of existing dwellings, thus raising 
                                                        
6 Money Market Mutual Funds (MMMF) as well are important creditors for financial institutions involved 
in securitization. However, for the purpose of this paper, their intermediation activity can be captured in 
the relation between rentiers and FFs. 
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households’ wealth through time. Accordingly, we keep the amounts of houses (H) 
constant. We apply the same logic to equities (E), which in this model simply represent 
shareholders’ initial contributions to the constitution of financial corporations. 
 
3. Financial sector’s leverage and profitability under securitization.  
The so-called ‘banking approach’ to the recent evolution of modern financial systems has 
stressed how shadow banking practices were meant to allow financial operators to 
circumvent financial regulation, and to legally expand their business in search for larger 
profits. The unit of analysis of such a strand of literature is the single financial operator, 
say a proto-type commercial bank and/or investment bank, not the corresponding 
macroeconomic compartment as a whole. Even further, the emphasis is on the “legal” 
features of shadow banking financial architectures, say the legal status of SPV, allowing 
specific operators to reduce the costs of financing, to embark on a wider-scale business 
activity, and to (apparently) maintain their own financial solidity. Last but not least, the 
description of shadow banking mechanisms is rarely formalised through an even simple 
analysis of the accounting relationships connecting each other the different components 
of the entire financial industry. To sum up, most of the existing literature on shadow 
banking has hardly developed any formal investigation of the macroeconomic rationale 
of securitization and the issuance of structured finance products.  
In this section of the paper, we try fill this gap by proposing a formal macro-sectorial 
analysis of shadow banking. In particular, we try to formally describe how shadow 
banking practices, i.e. the securitization of existing assets (say mortgages), and the 
creation of structured finance products (say CDOs), were meant to affect the profitability 
and the financial solidity of both CBs and FF macro-industries. In order to keep our 
analysis as simple as possible, we focus our attention on two standard measures of 
profitability and financial solidity (read leverage): the return on equity (ROE), and the 
asset-to-equity ratio (the liability-to-equity ratio in the case of FFs – see more on this 
below). In particular, we show how, in the last decades, both the CB sector the FF 
industry may have modified such variables by exploiting the accounting properties 
associated to shadow banking instruments, as well as the ampler margins of manoeuver 
opened up by shadow banking practices. 
We perform a simple static analysis, in which we compare the current financial world 
with financialization with respect to an old financial reality without shadow banking. We 
think this methodology to be valuable for at least three reasons. First, it helps to avoid a 
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cumbersome mathematical formalization, whilst still being rigorous from a formal and 
accounting point of view. Second, it allows us to effectively describe, although in a static 
fashion, the changes taking place in modern financial sectors thanks to the introduction 
of shadow banking. Third, it maintains at the centre of the analysis, and in the simplest 
way possible, the two main dimensions, i.e. profitability and financial solidity, shadow 
banking practices were purposely conceived to influence. Interestingly, macro-sectorial 
leverage (read financial soundness) is now considered as a fundamental financial 
variable to take into account in performing increasingly needed macro-prudential 
regulation.     
 
3.1 The commercial bank sector 
Consistently with the description of shadow banking provided in Table 1 and Table 2, 
CBs first originate financial assets, i.e. mortgages, and then distribute them throughout 
the financial system, thanks to the securitization process. At the same time, they provide 
other financial operators with the required loans, i.e. repos, in order to buy securitised 
assets. In this sense, CBs act on both sides of the market for securitised assets (see Botta 
et al., 2015:212). This process affects CBs’ leverage, as stated in equation (1):     
 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝐶𝐵 =
𝛾1[(1 − 𝑧)𝑀 + 𝐿] + 𝛾2𝑅𝑃 + 𝛾3𝐽
𝐸𝐶𝐵
 
(1) 
 
According to standard procedures to compute financial actors’ capital adequacy ratios 
and leverages, financial assets are weighted for their perceived degree of riskiness, which 
also depends on the assets’ time to maturity. These procedures have been outlined in the 
(voluntary) agreements known as Basel (I, II, and III) accords.  One of the pillars of these 
accords is in fact the comprehensive system to riskweight bank’s assets (see Getter, 
2014). In equation (1),  𝛾𝑛 (with n from 1 to 3) stands for the different weights associated 
to the four assets CBs may hold in their balance sheet. Mortgages to workers, as well as 
loans to firms, are classified as long-term (relatively) risky assets with respect to repos 
and cash. Repos usually are short-term collateralized monetary market loans with a 
perceived low risk, whilst cash is a risk-free asset. Consistently with the technical aspects 
of Basel accords on leverage and capital adequacy ratios (see Bis, 2017), we can assume 
(𝛾1 > 𝛾2 > 𝛾3) and (𝛾3 = 0), so that: 
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𝑙𝑒𝑣𝐶𝐵 =
𝛾1[(1 − 𝑧)𝑀 + 𝐿] + 𝛾2𝑅𝑃
𝐸𝐶𝐵
 
(1.b) 
 
Consistently with equation (1.b), the profitability of the overall CBs sector, as 
measured by ROE, is: 
 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐵 =
𝑖𝑀(1 − 𝑧)𝑀 + 𝑖𝐿𝐿 + 𝑖𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑃
𝐸𝐶𝐵
 
(2) 
 
Through the repo system, CBs provide financial corporations with the required means 
of payments to buy a part of securitised mortgages. The remaining portion is financed by 
the issuance of structured finance products, namely CDO. If we assume that total CDO 
issuance represents a portion 𝜗 of the value of total securitised mortgages, we get:  
 
𝐶𝐷𝑂 = 𝜗𝑧𝑀 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ    0 < 𝜗 < 1 (3) 
𝑅𝑃 = (1 − 𝜗)𝑧𝑀 (4) 
Substituting equations (3) and (4) into (1.b) and (2) respectively, we get: 
 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝐶𝐵 =
𝛾1𝐿 + [𝛾1(1 − 𝑧) + 𝛾2(1 − 𝜗)𝑧]𝑀
𝐸𝐶𝐵
 
(5) 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐵 =
𝑖𝐿𝐿 + [𝑖𝑀(1 − 𝑧) + 𝑖𝑅𝑃(1 − 𝜗)𝑧]𝑀
𝐸𝐶𝐵
 
(6) 
 
 
In order to get the effects of securitization on CBs’ leverage and profitability, first 
compare equation (5) with the corresponding leverage ratio that would emerge, given the 
total amount of initial mortgages, in the hypothetical absence of securitization (i.e. when 
𝑧 = 0). We get: 
 
[TABLE 3] 
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It is straightforward to verify through simple algebraic passages that the condition for 
CBs to reduce their leverage and improving their financial solidity under securitization 
reads: 
 
[
𝛾2
𝛾1
(1 − 𝜗) − 1] 𝑧 < 0              (7) 
 
Condition (7) always holds true since that (𝛾2 < 𝛾1). This clearly tells us that, for a given 
value of credit (𝐿 + 𝑀)  provided by CBs to the economic system as a whole, the 
securitization process allows commercial banks to decrease their leverage.  
Given this, it is now possible to analyse the extent by which such a securitization-
induced reduction in leverage gives additional space to CBs for the aggressive expansion 
of mortgage issuances. In order to see this, assume that CBs originate different amounts 
of mortgages, 𝑀𝑆𝐸𝐶 and  𝑀 , referring respectively to the scenario with and without 
securitization, such that their leverage remains constant. Focusing on the numerator of 
equation (5), the leverage ratio is: 
 
𝛾1𝐿 + [𝛾1(1 − 𝑧) + 𝛾2(1 − 𝜗)𝑧]𝑀
𝑆𝐸𝐶 = 𝛾1𝐿 + 𝛾1𝑀 (8) 
 
Hence: 
 
𝑀𝑆𝐸𝐶 =
𝛾1
[𝛾1(1 − 𝑧) + 𝛾2(1 − 𝜗)𝑧]
𝑀 (9) 
 
From condition (7), we know that 
𝛾1
[𝛾1(1−𝑧)+𝛾2(1−𝜗)𝑧]
> 1 so that 𝑀𝑆𝐸𝐶 > 𝑀. For a given 
level of leverage, the banking sector involved in securitization is able to issue more 
mortgages and expand aggressively its business. 
In order to see how this finding affects CBs’ profitability, we can look at CBs’ ROE 
with and without securitization (for a given level of leverage). With a given 𝐸𝐶𝐵, we can 
focus on ROE numerator. The condition for CBs to increase profitability under 
securitization (and the ensuing provision of repo lending to FFs) reads: 
 
𝑖𝐿𝐿 + 𝑖𝑀𝑀 < 𝑖𝐿𝐿 +
[𝑖𝑀(1 − 𝑧) + 𝑖𝑅𝑃(1 − 𝜗)𝑧]𝛾1
[𝛾1(1 − 𝑧) + 𝛾2(1 − 𝜗)𝑧]
𝑀 
 
(10) 
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After some trivial mathematical passages, condition (10) boils down to:  
 
𝑖𝑀 < 𝑖𝑅𝑃
𝛾1
𝛾2
 (11) 
 
Condition (11) defines the economic circumstances under which, given CBs leverage, 
shadow bank practices could allow CBs to increase their profitability. Four points are 
worth stressing as to the fulfilment of condition (11).  
First, ceteris paribus, the higher the degree of riskiness 𝛾1 of mortgages created by 
CBs, the more likely securitization and ‘originate-and-distribute’ practices will raise CBs 
profitability. Accordingly, CBs will be highly incentivized to embark in securitization, and 
securitization practices will quickly spread among financial operators. It goes without 
saying that this scenario may fairly well describe the economic environment emerging in 
the US at the beginning of the 2000s, with the boom in sub-prime lending.  
Second, such a (profitable) spread of securitization would get even more momentum 
the lower is the perceived riskiness of repo lending (i.e. the lower is 𝛾2), as determined by 
the extent with which repo collaterals could potentially be converted at par by liquidity 
providers in the event of borrower’s default (see Gabor, 2016). It is well known that 
before the last financial crisis an increasing part of repo contracts were collateralised by 
CDOs ranked as riskless “triple-A” assets. In a way, shadow banking gave rise to a self-
fulfilling process. Securitization provided the financial system with the raw materials 
(securitized mortgages) for the production of complex structured financial products 
(CDOs). FFs, in turn, produced allegedly safe CDOs, which made securitization 
increasingly profitable (thanks to supposedly secure repo lending).  
Third, consistently with points 1 and 2, banking regulation aimed at restraining the 
creation of risky assets (say sub-prime mortgages) by attaching higher a risk coefficient 
(i.e. a higher value of 𝛾1) to risky assets (say sub-prime mortgages), may turn counter-
productive under securitization. Indeed, it could end out encouraging CBs to undertake 
securitization even more aggressively, rather than disincentive it.  
Fourth, securitization is even more likely to increase CBs profitability in a context of 
relatively high monetary market interest rates. Indeed, the higher the interest rate on 
repos, the higher the revenues (and hence profitability) accruing to CBs thanks to this 
specific type of lending. Thus the securitization process that repos aim at fostering and 
financing, will get even more frenetic. This was the ‘rentier-friendly’ scenario prevailing 
in most developed economies in the years immediately before the outbreak of the crisis. 
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To sum up, equations (1) to (11) analytically describe the regulatory arbitrage CBs 
carry out through securitization. Securitization allows them to circumvent capital 
adequacy regulation and to expand the volume of risky assets they can originate (see 
Jacobson, 2017). This, in turn, permits CBs to likely increase their profits without 
compromising their own financial solidity. What could be seriously injured is certainly 
the solidity if the financial system as a whole given the increasing amount of risky assets 
eventually distributed through it. Our findings are perfectly in line with Minsky’s 
analysis, which explained how banks rely on balance sheet’s transformations to 
overcome policy regulations. However, the securitization process we describe involve the 
asset side of banks’ balance rather than their liabilities. The liability management 
described by Minsky (e.g. Minsky, 1975:122) is replaced by an asset management. If 
regulatory monetary institutions aim at bringing back the financial system to a safe 
position, they have to directly restrain the kind of securitization practices financial 
operators can adopt.7  
 
3.2 The financial firm sector   
In our model, the FFs sector is the counterpart of CBs in the securitization process. In 
order to compute FFs sector’s financial leverage, it is relevant to move the attention on 
their liability side. As mentioned above, FFs have two different sources of funds. They 
can collect money either by selling CDOs, or by increasing their short-term indebtedness 
towards banks through repos. Albeit appearing on the liability side of the sectoral 
balance sheet, these two sources are completely different in terms of their impact on the 
financial stability of the sector. While repos are an extremely short-term form of debt, 
CDOs are the financial instruments whose production and sale represent the core 
business of this stylized sector, and is therefore a more stable and (much) longer-term 
source of finance. In this sense, we follow Perotti and Suarez (2009) and take explicitly 
into account the different degrees of maturity of FFs’ liabilities to assess the overall 
sector financial solidity. Before the outbreak of the last financial crisis, repos were 
perceived as a rather stable source of funds, whose reliability nevertheless strongly 
depended on the “convertibility at par” of the collateral assets temporarily sold by 
borrowers (FFs) to cash providers (CBs). In the years immediately before the crisis, 
CDOs were considered as safe collaterals for repos. Such a convention abruptly broke 
                                                        
7 Following Lavoie (2012), a possible solution could consist in allowing traditional securitization practices 
only, according to which assets are not moved out of CBs’ balance sheets, but remain in the balance sheet 
of the originators. 
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down in the midst of the crisis, and the run on repos actually demonstrated how quickly 
repo markets could dry up and repo lending become unavailable. Following Adrian and 
Shin (2010) and Adrian et al. (2013), Leman Brothers’ high exposure to (repo-centred) 
short-term borrowing was the main reason of its bankruptcy and the ensuing systemic 
earthquake. Consistently with these arguments, we assume that a coefficient 𝜆1  is 
attached to short-term repo financing, whilst 𝜆2 is assigned to long-term CDOs-based 
financing, with 𝜆1 > 𝜆2. Accordingly, equation (13) defines FFs’ leverage in terms of their 
liability structure: 
 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝐹𝐹 =
𝜆2𝐶𝐷𝑂 + 𝜆1𝑅𝑃
𝐸𝐹𝐹
  
(12) 
Consistently with the balance sheet matrix of our simplified economy, by plugging 
equations (3) and (4) into (12), we get: 
  
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝐹𝐹 =
𝜆2𝜗𝑧𝑀 + 𝜆1(1 − 𝜗)𝑧𝑀
𝐸𝐹𝐹
=
[𝜆2𝜗 + 𝜆1(1 − 𝜗)]𝑧𝑀
𝐸𝐹𝐹
 
(13) 
 
By totally differentiating equation (13) with respect to 𝑀 and 𝜗 and setting it equal to 
zero, one gets:  
 
𝑑𝑀
𝑀
=
[1 − (𝜆2 𝜆1⁄ )]
[(1 − 𝜗) + 𝜗(𝜆2 𝜆1⁄ )]
𝑑𝜗 > 0 
(14) 
 
Equation (14) simply tells that FFs can buy an increasing amount of mortgages from 
CBs (
𝑑𝑀
𝑀
> 0) while safely maintaining their leverage ratio unchanged (𝑑𝑙𝑒𝑣𝐹𝐹 = 0), just 
by increasing the share of their purchases which are financed through long-term CDOs 
issuances (𝑑𝜗 > 0). FFs were indeed highly interested in getting triple-A evaluations for 
their structured finance products. Following Coval et al. (2009), this helped FFs to 
artificially stimulate the demand for CDO by final investors, make new CDO issuances 
easier, and eventually expand their balance sheet in an allegedly safe way.  
The implications of the above leverage ratio ‘manipulation’ on FFs’ profitability are 
straightforward, and formalized in equation (15): 
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𝑅𝑂𝐸𝐹𝐹 =
[𝑖𝑀 − 𝜗(𝑟 − 𝑓) − (1 − 𝜗)𝑖𝑅𝑃]𝑧𝑀
𝐸𝐹𝐹
 
(15) 
 
According to the maturity and degree of riskiness of the different assets and liability 
implicitly considered in equation (15), and thus of the ensuing structure of interest rates, 
i.e. 𝑖𝑀 > 𝑖𝑅𝑃 > 𝑟, the profitability of FFs will increase through the expansion of the pool of 
securitized mortgages held in their balance sheet.8 Other way around, equations (14) and 
(15) together provide a mathematical representation of the well-known statement by 
Citigroup CEO Chuck Prince: “As long as the music is playing, you've got to get up and 
dance” (Nakamoto, 2007). Insofar as FFs had the opportunity to easily issue structured 
finance liabilities and increase their profits without affecting their apparently solid 
financial exposition, they had to do so.     
 
4. The impact of shadow banking on the real economy. 
Consistently with the overall portray of the economy as showed in Tables 1 and 2, we take 
into account a simple close economy without government. Consumption by workers’ and 
rentiers, as well as desired investments by NFF are the unique demand injections we take 
into account.  
According to matrices in Table 1 and Table 2, equations (16) and (17) define 
consumption expenditures by workers and rentiers (CW and CR), respectively. Workers’ 
(rentiers’) consumption depends positively on disposable income 𝑌𝐷𝑊  (𝑌𝐷𝑅)  and 
wealth  𝑉𝑊  (𝑉𝑅) , according to the corresponding parameters 𝑐1
𝑊  (𝑐1
𝑅)  and  𝑐2
𝑊  (𝑐2
𝑅) . 
Workers’ disposable income is given by the difference between the total wage bill (𝑤𝑁) 
and interests paid on the outstanding amount of mortgages (iMM). Workers’ wealth 
consists of deposits 𝐷, and houses 𝑝𝐻𝐻.   
 
𝐶𝑊 = 𝑐1
𝑊𝑌𝐷𝑊 + 𝑐2
𝑊 𝑉𝑊 (16) 
 
𝐶𝑅 = 𝑐1
𝑅𝑌𝐷𝑅 + 𝑐2
𝑅 𝑉𝑅 (17) 
 
Rentiers’ income depends exclusively on interests on CDO and dividends distributed 
by CBs and FFs: 
                                                        
8 Note that FFs will always be profitable since that, at the numerator of equation (15), (iM+ϑf ) is always 
higher than [ϑr + (1-ϑ)iRP] given that iM > r and iRP. 
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𝑌𝐷𝑅 = (𝑟 − 𝑓)𝐶𝐷𝑂𝑅 +𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐶𝐵 + 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐹𝐹 (18) 
With   𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐶𝐵 = 𝑖𝑀(1 − 𝑧)𝑀 + 𝑖𝐿𝐿 + 𝑖𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑃;  𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐹𝐹 = 𝑖𝑀𝑧𝑀 + (𝑓 − 𝑟)𝐶𝐷𝑂 − 𝑖𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑃 
 
Equation (19) below formalises desired productive investments by NFF: 
 
𝑔 =
𝐼
𝐾
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑢 − 𝛽2𝑖𝐿 + 𝛽3(𝜋 − 𝑟) + 𝛽4𝑟𝜓  (19) 
 
with 𝛽0,  𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, 𝛽4 > 0  and 𝜓 =
𝐶𝐷𝑂𝑁𝐹𝐹
𝑝𝐾
 as the ratio between NFFs’ financial assets 
(CDONFF) and their productive assets (pK), i.e. a standard measure of financialization of 
NFFs.  
Next to the autonomous component ( 𝛽0 ), several factors influence productive 
investments. First, desired productive investments depend positively on capacity 
utilization (𝑢) and negatively on the interest rate on loans from CBs (𝑖𝐿). Second, in the 
age of financialization, NFF have increasingly used retained earnings and loans from 
banks in order to acquire financial assets rather than productive means of productions 
(Stockhammer, 2004; Krippner, 2005). A potential trade-off stands out between 
financial and productive investments. Equation (19) captures this point by assuming that 
productive investments depend positively on the gap between the profit rate (𝜋) and 
returns on financial investments ( 𝑟 ). The higher is r with respect to 𝜋  (financial 
investments are relatively more lucrative) the higher are NFF’ incentives to divert 
resources towards financial investments themselves, thus scaling down productive 
investments. Finally, recent empirical studies about the impact of financialization on 
investments also show that financial earnings may sometimes provide additional 
resources for undertaking productive investments (Orhangazi, 2008; Tori and Onaran, 
2017). This is particularly true for relatively small, thus more financially constrained, 
companies. Accordingly, in equation (22), productive investments may also benefit from 
increasing financial earnings as a share of productive capital 𝑟𝜓. 
Equations (20), (21) and (22) describe the production technology and the supply side 
of the economy. We assume a constant coefficient production technique. Accordingly, 
employed labour force N is jointly given by the rate of capacity utilization (𝑢), the 
installed capital stock K, and labour productivity a (equation 20). NFF set the price of 
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their output by applying a mark-up (𝜇) on unit labour costs (equation 21). Equation (22) 
defines the profit share.         
 
𝑁 =
𝑢𝐾
𝑎
 
(20) 
    
𝑝 = (1 + 𝜇)
𝑤
𝑎
 (21) 
 
𝜋 =
𝑝𝑌 − 𝑤𝑁
𝑝𝐾
=
𝜇
1 + 𝜇
𝑢 = 𝜏𝑢 
(22) 
 
In order to find the equilibrium level of capacity utilization (𝑢∗), the corresponding 
growth rate of the productive capital stock (𝑔∗), one simply needs to find the demand-
driven equilibrium level of output on the goods market. After normalizing consumption 
expenditures by the value of the capital stock and after assuming that the interest rates 
on loans and mortgages are equal (i.e. 𝑖𝑀 = 𝑖𝐿 = 𝑖), we get: 
 
𝑢∗ =
[𝑐1
𝑅 − 𝑐1
𝑊]𝑖𝑚 + 𝑐1
𝑅𝜑 +  𝑐2
𝑤𝛺𝑤 + 𝑐2
𝑅𝛺𝑅 + 𝛽0 − 𝛽2𝑖 + (𝜓𝛽4 − 𝛽3)𝑟
[1 − 𝑐1
𝑊(1 − 𝜏) − 𝛽3𝜏 − 𝛽1]
 
 
(23) 
with 𝛺𝑅 =
𝑉𝑅
𝑝𝐾
;   𝛺𝑊 =
𝑉𝑊
𝑝𝐾
; 𝑚 =
𝑀
𝑝𝐾
; 𝑙 =
𝐿
𝑝𝐾
;  𝜑 =
𝑌𝐷𝑅−𝑖𝑀
𝑝𝐾
= 𝑖𝑙 + (𝑓 − 𝑟)
𝐶𝐷𝑂𝑁𝐹𝐹
𝑝𝐾
 
  
𝑔∗ = 𝛽0 + (𝛽1 + 𝛽3𝜏)𝑢
∗ − 𝛽2𝑖 + (𝛽4𝜓 − 𝛽3)𝑟  (24) 
 
Even further, we also analyse the distributive consequences of shadow banking 
practices by computing the ratio (𝜎∗) between labour income and rentiers’ income as 
emerging out of the short-run equilibrium (see equation 25 below). Admittedly, this is an 
overly simple measure of income distribution. Yet, it may well reflect the outstanding 
evidence about rentiers’ increasing capacity to ‘appropriate’ larger parts of domestic 
income also through complex financial relations. Indeed, there is no doubt that new 
financial dynamics, and the connected rise in rentier-type income (versus labour income) 
lie behind the rising inequality registered in developed countries in the last decades 
(Epstein and Power, 2003; Piketty, 2014).     
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𝜎∗ =
𝑌𝐷𝑅
𝑤𝑁 − 𝑖𝑀
=
𝜒
(1 − 𝜏)𝑢∗ − 𝑖𝑚
 
(25) 
 
with 𝜒 = 𝑌𝐷𝑅 𝑝𝐾⁄ = 𝜑 + 𝑖𝑚 
 
4.1 Comparative statics 1: the case of a house mortgage boom 
Once defined the short-run equilibria of our model, we can analyse how changes in 
financialization-related variables may affect the real economy, as well as modify the 
equilibrium itself. Let assume, for instance, that the development of shadow banking 
practices led financial institutions to aggressively increase the quantity of mortgages (M) 
conceded to workers through time. In turn, this has raised workers’ wealth (by raising 
dwellings’ price), as well as their corresponding indebtedness. On the one hand, the (ex-
post) increase in workers’ wealth (ΩW) may possibly feed more consumption through a 
kind of ‘Bhaduri-type’ capital gain channel (Bhaduri, 2011).9 On the other hand, higher 
debt service payments on the shoulders of working households indirectly redistribute 
income from workers to rentiers (through more generous dividends distributed by CB). 
While consumption expenditures of the latter might increase, the former might have to 
reduce consumption due to a lower disposable income. The overall effect of such a long 
process of financialization on economic activity is unclear, as counter-balancing forces 
are at work. Indeed, by differentiating equation (26) with respect to 𝑚, we get: 
 
𝑑𝑢∗ =
[(𝑐1
𝑅 − 𝑐1
𝑊)𝑖 + 𝑐2
𝑤(𝜕𝛺𝑤 𝜕𝑚⁄ )]
[1 − 𝑐1
𝑊(1 − 𝜏) − 𝛽3𝜏 − 𝛽1]
𝑑𝑚 
 
(
(26) 
It is straightforward to see that the numerator of equation (26) can be either positive 
or negative. The term (𝑐1
𝑅 − 𝑐1
𝑊)𝑖  is surely negative and constitutes a financial-led 
extraction on economic activity since that  𝑐1
𝑅 < 𝑐1
𝑊 . This condition represents the 
negative effects on aggregate consumption of redistributing income away from workers 
towards rentier. Redistribution takes indirectly place through the mediation of FFs’ by 
the creation of new (rentiers’) financial assets and, correspondingly, new (workers’) 
                                                        
9 We ground our first comparative statics exercise on the effect that, in a highly financialized economy, the 
past heightened stream of mortgage creations may have induced on current consumption by raising 
households’ wealth and, at the same time, households’ indebtedness. Differently from Bhaduri et al. 
(2015), in equation (23) we do not explicitly take into account a positive link between current consumption 
expenditures and current capital gains. We do this in order to maintain our model as simple as possible. 
The inclusion of this further element, although absolutely feasible within our framework, would have 
complicated the analysis, without adding much to its economic implications. 
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liabilities. However, the ‘consumption expanding’ wealth effect 𝑐2
𝑤(𝜕𝛺𝑤 𝜕𝑚⁄ ) is positive. 
Economic activity will thus contract (expand) in the event the first distributive factor 
would outstrip (fall below) the wealth factor. In the first case, paraphrasing Bhaduri and 
Marglin (1990:38), we deal with a ‘shadow banking-led stagnationist regime’. In the 
second case, an ‘exhilarationist’ scenario prevails. 
It is important to stress that the case for a shadow banking-led exhilarationist regime 
hinges upon the assumption that the more generous extension of mortgages to working 
households may have allowed them to considerably increase the demand for houses, 
hence paving the way for rising house prices, the housing boom and, eventually, rising 
households’ wealth. Nonetheless, it is equally interesting to consider the alternative 
scenario in which the excessive creation of mortgages, by leading households to become 
over-indebted, may eventually induce some of them to (perhaps forcefully) sell their 
houses (in order to make up for their debt) and prompt a drop (rather than an increase) 
in housing prices and households’ wealth. More formally, given the total amount of 
houses (H) in the economy, we may have: 
 
Ω𝑤(𝑡) = 𝑝𝐻(𝑡)𝐻 + 𝐷 = 𝑓 (𝐻
𝑑(𝑀(𝜁, 𝑡)) − 𝜃(∫ 𝑀(𝜁, 𝑠)𝑑𝑠)𝐻
𝑡
0
)𝐻 + 𝐷 
 
where 𝐻𝑑(𝑀(𝜁, 𝑡))  is the demand for houses at time t as determined by mortgages 
conceded in the same period (i.e. 𝑀(𝜁, 𝑡)); ∫ 𝑀(𝜁, 𝑠)𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
 is the outstanding total amount of 
mortgages, and 𝜃(. )  is the fraction of existing houses sold on the market by over-
indebted households, with (𝜕𝜃 𝜕⁄ (∫ 𝑀(𝜁, 𝑠)𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
)) ≥ 0. Last but not least, ‘ζ’ stands for an 
institutional parameter describing the easiness with which CBs can extend mortgages to 
working households, with 𝑀𝜁(𝑡) = (𝜕𝑀(𝑡) 𝜕𝜁⁄ ) > 0. 
In such a framework, with institutional limits to the creation of mortgages relaxed by 
the ‘originate and distribute’ practices associated to securitization (i.e. a higher value of 
ζ), and in proximity of the eruption of the subprime crisis, we might have: 
 
𝜕𝛺𝑤(𝑡)
𝜕𝜁
=
𝜕𝑝𝐻(𝑡)
𝜕𝜁
𝐻 = {
𝜕𝐻𝑑
𝜕𝑀(𝜁, 𝑡)
𝑀𝜁(𝑡) −
𝜕𝜃
𝜕 [∫ 𝑀(𝜁, 𝑠)𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
]
[∫ 𝑀𝜁(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
]𝐻}𝐻 < 0 
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According to the above expression, the overexpansion of mortgages that previously fed 
the housing bubble and economic expansion (i.e. du*/dm>0), may ultimately cause the 
bubble to burst, and trigger off the crisis and the ensuing recession (du*/d<0). An initial 
exhilarationist regime might eventually turn in a stagnationst one, with tough 
consequences in terms of income inequality (see more on this below).10 
According to equation (24), the expansionary or contractionary effect of a house 
mortgage boom on economic activity is transmitted to productive capital accumulation 
through the standard accelerator component. More in details, we have: 
 
𝑑𝑔∗ = (𝛽1 + 𝛽3𝜏)(𝜕𝑢
∗ 𝜕𝑚⁄ )𝑑𝑚  (27) 
 
As far as income distribution is concerned, a reduction or an increase in the ratio 
between rentiers’ and workers’ income will highly depend on within which of the two 
regimes (expansionary or contractionary) the shadow banking-led house mortgage boom 
takes place. Totally differentiating equation (25) with respect to ‘m’, one gets: 
 
𝑑𝜎∗ =
𝑖[(1 − 𝜏)𝑢∗ − 𝑖𝑚] − 𝜒[(1 − 𝜏) 𝜕𝑢∗ 𝜕𝑚⁄ − 𝑖]
[(1 − 𝜏)𝑢∗ − 𝑖𝑚]2
𝑑𝑚 
 
 
After some re-arrangements, we can verify that a house mortgage boom could 
hypothetically squeeze income inequality, i.e. (𝑑𝜎∗ 𝑑𝑚⁄ < 0) should condition (28) be 
fulfilled: 
 
𝜀𝑢,𝑚 > 𝜂
∗
(1 + 𝜎∗)
𝜎∗
 
 
(28) 
 
where 𝜀𝑢,𝑚  is the elasticity of economic activity to an increase in the number of 
mortgages created by CB, while 𝜂∗ is workers’ debt service-to-income ratio.  
Referring to the above set of equations, it is straightforward to see that, should 
economic activity react negatively to an expanding mortgage market  (𝜀𝑢,𝑚 < 0) , 
                                                        
10 Since the beginning of the 2000s, investment in the housing market has been significantly motivated by 
speculative purposes (i.e. by the attempt to realise capital gains by exploiting bullish trends in the price of 
houses). Speculation in the housing market, the formation of housing bubbles and their ultimate explosion 
are certainly consistent with our description of the evolution of housing prices as associated to the 
increasing provision of mortgages and the over-indebtedness of households. Nonetheless, for the sake of 
simplicity, we do not explicitly model this aspect, which is out of the scope of the present work.   
26 
 
condition (28) will never be satisfied. Financialization-led economic slowdown or 
recessions will go hand in hand with worsening income distributions. By the same token, 
a contraction in economic activity as due to households’ over-indebtedness giving rise to 
the burst of the housing bubble, will bring about an even more unequal distribution of 
generated income between rentiers and working households. Perhaps more interestingly, 
a detailed reading of condition (28) reveals that a more equalitarian income distribution 
could be quite far from arising even in the contest of a financialization-led economic 
expansion. Indeed, economic activity might even react positively to expanding mortgage 
lending, but still not enough to meet condition (28). Also note that the higher the 
workers’ debt service burden (𝜂∗), the greater the right-hand-side of condition (28), and 
the more likely it will be above 1. In this context, in order to improve income distribution 
during financialization-driven economic expansions, economic activity should over-react 
by far to mortgage increases. It goes without saying that it is hard to imagine that such a 
scenario will ever take place, so that a financialization-led expansions will likely be 
characterized by persistently worsening income distributions. 
Our concern appears even more grounded should we assume rentiers receiving 
dividends from NFFs on top of interest rate receivable accruing to them through shadow 
banking-created assets. The inclusion in our model of NFFs dividends would imply 
modifying equation (25) into equation (25.b): 
 
𝜎(25.𝑏)
∗ =
𝑌𝐷𝑅+𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑁𝐹𝐹
𝑤𝑁−𝑖𝑀
=
𝜒+𝛼𝜏𝑢∗
(1−𝜏)𝑢∗−𝑖𝑚
           
(25.b) 
 
with ‘α’ as the share of NFFs profits distributed to rentiers in the form of dividends. A 
first-sight comparison between equation (25) and equation (25.b) immediately shows 
that the inclusion in our model of NFFs dividends would bring about a ‘negative’ effect 
on income inequality (i.e. income more unequally distributed in favour of rentiers). As to 
the dynamic effects of shadow banking-led macroeconomics, a finance-led increase in 
capacity utilization will more likely come together with a worsening income distribution. 
Indeed, ceteris paribus, a rise in u* will now cause an increase in NFFs dividends to 
rentiers on top of higher interest rates receivables (as due to a higher m), the first form of 
improvement in rentiers’ income not being considered in our ‘baseline’ scenario. The 
case of a shadow banking-led stagnationist regime will maintain its distributional 
properties, with a more unequal income distribution emerging alongside a declining 
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capacity utilization.11 In the end, the development of shadow banking practices have 
contributed to create a rentier-friendly economic environment, in which rentiers are 
more likely better off regardless the specific economic regime shadow banking practices 
may give rise to.    
 
4.2 Comparative statics 2: Living in a world where rentiers are well alive 
There is a mounting debate among economists and policy-makers about the effects of the 
current unusually low level of interest rates on economic activity. Critics (see Bindseil et 
al., 2015) stress that low interest rates, as induced by unconventional monetary policies, 
jeopardize savers. Accordingly, they call for a quick return to normality so that savings 
could be remunerated properly, and investment stimulated from the supply side of the 
credit market. In order to assess if this orthodox claim finds any ground, it is interesting 
to see what happens in our model if we assume a generalized increase in the interest 
rates on financial activities, and thus higher remunerations for rentiers and NFF on their 
respective financial asset holdings. This exercise could somehow represent the economic 
scenario prevailing in the last years preceding the outbreak of the 2007-2008 crisis, 
when rentiers were ‘well alive and in a good shape’. 
For the sake of simplicity, let assume that interest rates on financial assets all increase 
by the same amount, so that di= diRP= dr. Equations (29) and (30) define the effect of 
such ‘rentier-friendly’ economic scenario on economic activity and productive capital 
investments respectively: 
 
𝑑𝑢∗ =
𝑐1
𝑅𝜉⏞
+
−𝑐1
𝑊𝑚⏞    
−
−[𝛽2 + (𝛽3 − 𝛽4𝜓)]⏞            
?
[1 − 𝑐1
𝑊(1 − 𝜏) − 𝛽3𝜏 − 𝛽1]
𝑑𝑟 = 𝜐𝑑𝑟 
 
𝑑𝑔∗ = [(𝛽1 + 𝛽3𝜏)𝜐+ [(𝛽4𝜓 − 𝛽3) − 𝛽2]⏞                      
?
] 𝑑𝑟 
 
 
(29) 
 
 
(30) 
As before, there are no clear-cut conclusions and different regimes could prevail. 
Hypothetically, a ‘rentier-led’ regime akin to the ‘puzzling’ regime described by Hein 
                                                        
11  Through simple manipulations of equations (25.b), we get: 𝜎(25.𝑏)
∗ =
(1+𝜒 𝛼𝜏𝑢∗)⁄
[(1−𝜏)/𝛼𝜏−𝑖𝑚/𝛼𝜏𝑢∗]
. From this 
expression, it is easy to see that any reduction in u* will reduce the denominator of equation (25.b) and, at 
the same time, will raise its numerator. Income inequality will certainly increase in the context of a 
finance-led economic contraction. Interestingly, this result would not emerge in a standard post-Keynesian 
model without shadow banking, in which income distribution is determined, in the short run, by the 
“distributional parameters” μ (hence τ) and α. 
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(2010) could emerge, with both capacity utilization and productive capital accumulation 
responding positively to increased rentiers’ income. However, the economic mechanisms 
leading to this outcome are different. Indeed, Hein (2010) puts at the centre of his 
analysis the financialization of NFF, and the redistribution of NFF profits to rentiers in 
the form of higher dividends as the prime mechanism possibly leading to rentier-led 
economic expansions. In this paper, redistribution takes place between workers and 
rentiers via the mediation of an ‘active’ financial sector, which constantly creates new 
(financial) investment opportunities for rentiers, along with new liabilities for workers. 
More in details, equation (29) implies that the equilibrium level of capacity utilization 
would expand due to higher interest rates only if increasing rentiers’ consumptions 
would more than compensate for the reduction in workers’ one, as well as for the likely 
contraction in NFF’ productive investments. In this sense, equation (30) also tells that 
productive capital accumulation might hypothetically react both ways in a world of 
relatively high interest rates. Yet, the more NFF consider financial assets as substitute for 
real investment, the more likely the sponsoring a ‘rentier-friendly’ environment will lead 
productive investments to stagnate.12 
Last but not least, the distributive effects of such a generalised increase in interest 
rates can be analysed by taking equation (25) and totally differentiating it with respect to 
i, r and u. We get:  
 
𝑑𝜎∗ =
{(𝑙+𝑚)[(1−𝜏)𝑢∗−𝑖𝑚]+𝑚𝜒}
[(1−𝜏)𝑢∗−𝑖𝑚]2
𝑑𝑖 −
𝜓
[(1−𝜏)𝑢∗−𝑖𝑚]
𝑑𝑟 −
(1−𝜏)𝜒
[(1−𝜏)𝑢∗−𝑖𝑚]2
𝑑𝑢∗                                        (31) 
 
Under the simplifying assumption according to which di = dr, and after noting that du* = 
νdr from equation (29), equation (31) can be aptly manipulated in order to obtain the 
following expression: 
 
𝑑𝜎∗
𝑑𝑟
=
(𝑙+𝑚−𝜓)−[(1−𝜏)𝜐−𝑚]𝜎∗
[(1−𝜏)𝑢∗−𝑖𝑚]
  
 
                                                        
12 A generalized increase in interest rates will usually curtail productive investments by NFF through two 
main channels. First, external financing from CBs will get more expansive. Secondly, and perhaps more 
relevantly in a time of financialization, the accumulation of financial assets rather than productive ones 
will become relatively more remunerative. The only possible way through which NFF financialization could 
go hand in hand with booming productive investments is by providing NFF with higher cash flows, and 
hence more ‘internal’ resources to finance additional productive investments, as accruing by holding highly 
remunerative structured finance products.    
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Condition (32) below defines under which circumstances income distribution might 
paradoxically improve (i.e. (𝑑𝜎∗ 𝑑𝑟) < 0⁄ ) when financial assets (structured and non-
structured) guarantee remunerative returns: 
 
(𝑙 + 𝑚 − 𝜓) < [(1 − 𝜏)𝜐 − 𝑚]𝜎∗                                                                                                  (32) 
 
In line with the findings of the previous point, a ‘rentier-friendly’ world will be hardly 
associated with an improving income distribution. Indeed, should increases in the 
relative remunerativeness of financial assets versus productive assets entail a contracting 
economic activity, i.e. (𝜐 < 0), condition (32) will never hold true. During recessions, 
rentiers will forge further ahead with respect to wage earners. During expansions, 
income inequality might theoretically shrink. Nonetheless, (𝜐 > 0) is not sufficient for 
condition (31) to fulfil. Actually, a ‘rentier-led expansion-with-decreasing inequality’ 
might only take place if the positive response by economic activity will be strong enough 
to overcome the left-hand side of condition (32). Interestingly, the right-hand side of 
equation (32) is a positive function of ‘m’, whilst its left-hand side responds positively to 
the wage share (1 − 𝜏) and negatively to m. Accordingly, the higher is the degree of 
financialization of the economy (as grasped by the ratio between house mortgages and 
the productive capital stock) the harder the possibility that any rise in interest rates on 
financial assets could lead to a more equitable income distribution. Even further, the 
economic context characterizing most developed economies since the mid-1970s, i.e. the 
persistent reduction in the wage shares (as favoured by NFF financialization), makes 
even more unrealistic the fulfilment of condition (32). These findings seem to recall how 
a Keynesian-type ‘euthanasia of the rentiers’ might be highly desirable in order to feed a 
sustained, and more equitable, economic recovery.   
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the post-Keynesian analysis of financialization by presenting 
an ‘augmented’ post-Keynesian model in which an ‘active’ shadow banking sector 
producing structured finance instruments is explicitly formalized. 
We show from a macroeconomic point of view how, before the crisis, securitization 
and shadow banking allowed financial institutions to increase the issuance of mortgages, 
as well as the profitability of the whole financial sector, while apparently keeping their 
financial position stable. In this sense, the 1996 reinterpretation of the Glass-Steagall act 
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(eventually repealed in 1999) appears as a turning point (see the corresponding sudden 
and steep rise of MBS in Figure 1). Even further, interpreting the post-crisis fall in MBS 
issuances as a signal of the end of shadow banking can be extremely erroneous, probably 
a pure wishful thinking. Figure 2 shows the stock of four different loans owned and 
securitised in the US: revolving credit, motor vehicle loans, consumer credit, and student 
loans. It is easy to see how all the series present astonishing upward trends in the post-
crisis period. Interestingly, and complementary to the economic implications of Figure 2, 
Segoviano et al. (2015) show how such a recovery in securitization seems to be a global 
phenomenon, which goes beyond the US economy. This is certainly the case of Europe, 
where the share of “placed” securitised assets with respect to “retained” ones (i.e. the 
share of securitised assets effectively sold on financial markets rather than held on the 
balance sheets of the originators of the underlying loans) is approaching pre-crisis levels.  
 
[FIGURE 2] 
 
Even worse, our model clearly shows that the securitization process makes legislations 
on capital requirement not only ineffective, but also potentially counterproductive. If 
banks have to comply with strict capital ratio requirements while having access to 
securitization, they will have a strong incentive to take part in the creation of structured 
finance products to lighten their balance sheets, hence harming the stability of the 
economy as a whole. It seems therefore necessary (and urgent) to apply some form of 
control and limitation to the link between the issuer of the credit and securitizing system. 
Securitization makes credit easier. Paraphrasing Keynes, ‘when the goal of credit 
issuance is not the financing of productive activities, but the creation of financial 
commodities, the job is likely to be highly noxious for the economy’. Traditional banks 
should be dragged out of the shades.  
The final part of the paper analyses the effects of shadow banking practices on 
economic activity, the accumulation of means of production, and income distribution. In 
modern financialized economies, any analysis of demand and growth regimes likely turns 
out as useless if it fails to consider how shadow banking related activity can redistribute 
income from wage earners to rentiers. This paper shows that a highly financialized 
economy and/or a ‘rentier-friendly’ regime very likely could give rise to economic 
stagnation with rising inequality. 
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This paper only takes into account short-term mechanisms. It could be considered as a 
first step of a promising venue of research in which shadow banking practices are 
explicitly integrated into macro models. The natural following steps would be to take into 
account further features of shadow banking as tax and regulation avoidance, or credit 
supply distortions, as well as to broaden even further the existing contributions by 
Eatwell et al. (2008) and Nikolaidi (2015), in order to explore more in details how the 
internal circular dynamics of contemporaneous financial systems (i.e. the securitization 
of financial assets and the creation of complex structured financial products as propelled 
by the extension of repos lending) could affect the medium-to-long run evolution of the 
real economy in terms of economic growth, income distribution, and the stability of the 
economy as whole.  
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Figures and Tables  
Figure 1: Private depository institutions' total mortgages asset; Private depository 
institutions' repurchase agreements asset; Total real estate loans owned and securitized by 
Finance Companies. 1970Q2 =100, for all the series. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (US), Flow of Funds Z1. 
 
 
Figure 2: Selected assets owned and securitized by different kinds of financial entities 
(depository institutions, finance companies, credit unions, the federal government, 
nonfinancial business, nonprofit and educational institutions, and pools of securitized assets), 
2006Q1 =100. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Flow of Funds 
G19. 
 
 
 
37 
 
Table 1. Balance sheet matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Workers Rentiers NF-Firms 
Commercial 
Banks 
Financial 
Firms 
Central 
Bank 
Σ 
Capital   +K    +K 
Deposits +D 
  
-D 
  
0 
Houses +pHH      +pHH 
Cash    +JCB +JFF -J 0 
Mortgages -M 
  
+(1-z)M +zM 
 
0 
Loans   -L +L   0 
CDO 
 
+CDOR +CDONFF 
 
-CDO 
 
0 
Repos 
   
+RP -RP 
 
0 
Equities 
 
+E 
 
-ECB -EFF 
 
0 
Net worth NVW NVR NVNFF NVCB NVFF NV +K +pHH 
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Table 2. Full integration matrix 
 
 
Workers Rentiers 
Non-financial  
firms 
Commercial 
Banks 
Financial  
Firms 
Central 
Bank 
Σ 
 
current capital current capital current capital current capital current capital   
Wages +W 
   
-W 
     
 0 
Consumption -C 
   
+C 
     
 0 
Real Investment 
    
+I -I 
    
 0 
Financial 
payments:           
  
Dividends 
  
+DIV 
   
-DIVCB 
 
-DIVFF 
 
 0 
Mortgages -iM*M 
     
+iM*(1-z)*M 
 
+ iM*z*M 
 
 0 
CDOs 
  
+r*CDOR  
+r*CDONFF    
-r*CDO 
 
 0 
CDOs 
  
-f*CDOR  
-f*CDONFF    
+f*CDO 
 
 0 
Loans 
    
-iL*L  
+ iL*L    
 0 
Repos 
      
+ iRP*RP  
- iRP*RP  
 0 
Σ -SW +SW -SR +SR -PNFF +PNFF 0 0 0 0 - 0 
Change in: 
          
  
Deposits  -∆D      +∆D    0 
Houses 
 
-∆p*H 
        
 -∆p*H 
Mortgages 
 
+∆M 
     
-(1-z)*∆M 
 
-z*∆M  0 
Loans 
 
 
   
+∆L 
 
-∆L 
  
 0 
CDOs 
   
-∆CDOR  
-∆CDONFF    
+∆CDO  0 
Repos 
       
-∆RP 
 
+∆RP  0 
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - -∆P*H 
∆Net Worth 
∆NWW = SavW + ∆pM 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- -∆p*H 
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Table 3. Commercial banks leverage with and without securitization 
 With securitization Without securitization 
𝑙𝑒𝑣𝐶𝐵 
𝛾1𝐿 + [𝛾1(1 − 𝑧) + 𝛾2(1 − 𝜗)𝑧]𝑀
𝐸𝐶𝐵
       
𝛾1(𝐿 +𝑀)
𝐸𝐶𝐵
         
 
 
 
